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Abstract
Developing countries generally have poor governance infrastructure negatively affecting investment 
climate. Since economic growth of host countries is another important factor affecting the foreign 
direct investment decisions, the aim of the paper is to analyze the effect of governance infrastructure 
and economic growth with other control variables on FDI inflows in developing countries and to 
discuss policy implications to increase their FDI inflows. Since governance, FDI and growth are three 
concepts that interact with each other according to the theoretical and empirical literature, System 
GMM methodology is used to deal with endogeneity problem. It is found that improvements in 
governance and higher GDP growth rate attract more FDI inflows in developing countries.
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Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde Yönetişimin Gelen 
dOğrudan Yabancı SermaYe Yatırımları Üzerindeki 
rOlÜ
Özet
Gelişmekte olan ülkeler genellikle, yatırım ortamını olumsuz etkileyen yetersiz yönetişim yapılarına 
sahiptir. Ayrıca, ülkelerin ekonomik büyüme oranları yabancı sermaye yatırım kararlarını etkileyen 
diğer önemli bir faktör olduğundan dolayı çalışmanın amacı, gelişmekte olan ülkelerde yönetişim 
altyapısının ve ekonomik büyümenin diğer kontrol değişkenleriyle birlikte doğrudan yabancı sermaye 
girişleri üzerindeki etkisini incelemek ve bu ülkelere yapılan doğrudan yabancı sermaye yatırımlarının 
arttırılabilmeleri için uygun politikaları tartışmaktır. Yönetişim, doğrudan yabancı sermaye yatırımları 
ve büyüme, teorik ve ampirik literatüre göre, birbirini karşılıklı etkileyen kavramlar olduğundan, 
Sistem GMM metodu kullanılmıştır. Yönetişimdeki iyileşmelerin daha yüksek bir gayri safi yurtiçi 
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hasıla büyümesinin gelişmekte olan ülkelere daha yüksek miktarda doğrudan yabancı sermaye yatırımı 
çektiği bulunmuştur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yönetişim, Sistem GMM Analizi.
JEL Sınıflaması: C33, F21, O57, P48.
1. Introduction
There are several benefits that the host countries derive from foreign direct investment (FDI) 
inflows. First of all, “FDI is more conducive to long-run growth and development than other 
forms of capital inflows” 1 since FDI is a major source of technology and know-how. FDI enables 
knowledge and technology spillover from foreign firms to domestic firms  2. FDI also has the 
potential of job creation and employment in the host country  3. FDI “assists human capital 
formation, contributes to international trade integration, helps to create a more competitive 
business environment” 4. In time of economic crises that the host country faces, FDI is less inclined 
to run away than other forms of capital inflows, since it has affiliates in the host country and more 
involved in the business environment of the host country 5. Hence, the increased proportion of 
foreign investment in the form of FDI makes host country less vulnerable to rapid capital outflows 
in time of crises. Finally, FDI is an important source of financing the current account deficit 6.
The effect of governance on FDI inflows is firstly through the effect of institutions on investment 
environment of a country and secondly through the decreasing transaction costs, production 
costs and uncertainty 7. “Because the investment environment of a country affects both domestic 
and foreign investors, and because foreign direct investment (FDI) has been shown to promote 
host country efficiency, it is a natural extension of the literature to consider the impact of 
governance infrastructure on cross-country differences in FDI flows” 8.
The economic growth of the countries is also another important factor that affecting the foreign 
direct investment (FDI) decisions of multinational corporations along with governance quality. 
Hence the aim of the paper is to analyze effect of governance structure and economic growth on 
FDI inflows in developing countries with other control variables and to discuss policy implications 
1 J. P. Walsh and J. Yu, “Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Sectoral and Institutional Approach”, Imf 
working paper, WP/10/187, 2010, p.3.
2 Walsh and Yu, Ibid.
3 C. Jude, and M. I. Silaghi, “Foreign Direct Investment, Employment Creation and Economic Growth in CEE 
Countries. An Open Issue”, development, energy, environment, economics, 1998, pp.352-356.
4 OECD, foreign direct Investment for development, OECD Publications Service, 2002.
5 M. Busse, and C. Hefeker, “Political Risk, Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment”, european Journal of 
political economy, Vol.23, No.2, 2007, pp. 397-415.
6 Jude and Slaghi, Ibid.
7 S. Bellos, and T. Subasat, “Governance and Foreign Direct Investment: A Panel Gravity Model Approach”, 
International Review of applied economics, Vol.26, No.3, 2012, pp.303-28.
8 S. Globerman, and D. Shapiro, “Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The Role of Governance Infrastructure”, 
world development, Vol.30, No.11, 2002, p.1899.
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for these countries to increase their FDI inflows. Governance, FDI and growth interact with each 
other according to the theoretical and the empirical literature. Hence it is not possible to define 
a one-way relationship between them; instead there are two-way relationships between any pair 
of them. Due to this fact, System GMM methodology is used to deal with endogenity problem.
Next section presents conceptual background, empirical survey is in third section, and fourth 
section explains aggregate governance indicators used in the study. Data used in the study are 
explained in fifth section. Statistical analysis is carried out in sixth section. Seventh section 
presents both empirical methodology and empirical analysis of the study. Policy discussions are 
presented in the conclusion.
2. Conceptual Background
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2. Conceptual Background 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance, FDI and growth interact with each other according to the 
theoretical and the empirical literature. Hence it is not possible to define a one-
way relationship between them; instead there are two-way relationships between 
any pair of them. 
The impact of FDI on growth is expected to be twofold; (1) through the 
capital accumulation in the recipient economy, FDI is expected to be growth-
enhancing by encouraging the incorporation of new inputs and foreign 
technologies in the production function of the recipient economy, (2) through 
knowledge transfers, FDI is expected to augment the existing stock of 
knowledge in the recipient economy through labor training and skill acquisition, 
on the one hand, and through the introduction of alternative management 
practices and organizational arrangements, on the other9. 
Market-enhancing governance focuses on the role of governance in 
reducing transaction costs to make markets more efficient. Growth-enhancing 
governance focuses on the role of governance in enabling catching up by 
developing countries in a context of high-transaction cost developing country 
                                                        
9 L.R.De Mello, and M. T. Sinclair, “'Foreign Direct Investment, Joint Ventures, and 
Endogenous Growth”, Discussion Paper, Department of Economics, University of 
Kent, 1995.  
 FDI 
GOVERNANCE GROWTH 
Governance, FDI and growth interact with each other according to the theoretical and the 
empirical literature. Hence it is not possible to define a one-way relationship between them; 
instead there are two-way relationships between any pair of them.
The impact of FDI on growth is expected to be twof ld; (1) through the capital accumulation in 
the recipient economy, FDI is expected to be growth-enhancing by encouraging the incorporation 
of new inputs and foreign technologies in the p duction fu ction of the recipient economy, (2) 
through knowledge transfers, FDI is expected to augment the existing stock of knowledge in the 
recipient economy through labor trai ing and skill acquisition, on the o e ha d, and through the 
introduction of alternative management practices and organizational arrangements, on the other 9.
Market-enhancing governance focuses on the role of governance in reducing transaction costs to 
make markets more efficient. Growth-enhancing governance focuses on the role of governance 
in enabling catching up by developing countries in a context of high-transaction cost developing 
country markets. In particu ar, it focuses on the effectiveness of institutions for accelerating the 
transfer of assets and resources to more productive sectors 10.
Poor governance structure negatively affects the investment climate 11 of the countries. In the 
literature, it is widely accepted that low quality of governance increases economic uncertainties 
9 L.R.De Mello, and M. T. Sinclair, “‘Foreign Direct Investment, Joint Ventures, and Endogenous Growth”, Discussion 
Paper, department of economics, university of Kent, 1995.
10 M. H. Khan, “Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s”, desa working paper No. 54, 2007.
11 A. F. Aysan, M. K. Nabli, and M. A. V. Varoudakis, “Governance and Private Investment in the Middle East and 
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and cost of doing business 12, leads to partial, inequitable and inconsistent legal system which 
is unable to protect private property, rises political uncertainties due to civil disobedience or 
internal and external conflicts, and allows non-democratic practices of the governments in 
the form of unfair elections and electoral laws, absence of freedom of press, assembly and 
demonstration.
3. Empirical Survey
Instead of analyzing all the determinants of FDI in empirical literature, the study concentrates 
only on the literature about governance infrastructure as a determinant of FDI.
While, Globerman and Shapiro 13, Sekkat and Varoudakis 14, Busse and Hefeker 15 found positive 
significant relationship between political stability and FDI, Asiedu 16, Globerman and Shapiro 17, 
Jadhav 18 could not find a statistically significant relationship.
While Sekkat and Varoudakis 19, Aseidu and Lien 20, Cantah et al. 21 found positive significant 
relationship between economic stability and FDI, Asiedu 22 could not find a statistically significant 
relationship.
We will review the sub-indices of administrative quality. While Wei 23, Habib and Zurawicki 24, 
Globerman and Shapiro 25, Globerman and Shapiro 26, Busse and Hefeker 27, found negative 
North Africa”, ceRdI, etudes et documents, E 27, 2006.
12 S. J. Wei, “How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors?”, The Review of economics and statistics, Vol.82, 
No.1, 2000, pp.1-11.
13 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
14 K. Sekkat, and M. A. V. Varoudakis, Trade and foreign exchange liberalization, Investment climate, and fdI in 
the mena countries, World Bank, Middle East and North Africa, the Office of the Chief Economist, 2004.
15 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
16 E. Asiedu, “On the Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Different?”, 
world development, Vol.30, No.1, 2002, pp.107-119.
17 S. Globerman, and D. Shapiro, “Governance Infrastructure and US Foreign Direct Investment”, Journal of 
International Business studies, Vol.34, No.1, 2003, pp.19-39.
18 P. Jadhav, “Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in BRICS Economies: Analysis of Economic, Institutional 
and Political Factor”, procedia-social and Behavioral sciences, Vol.37, 2012, pp.5-14.
19 Sekkat and Varoudakis, Ibid.
20 E. Asiedu, and D. Lien, “Democracy, Foreign Direct Investment and Natural Resources”, Journal of International 
economics, Vol.84, No.1, 2011, pp.99-111.
21 W. G. Cantah, E. A. Wiafe, and A. Adams, “Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Policy Openness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, mpRa paper, No.58074, 2013.
22 Asiedu, Ibid.
23 Wei, Ibid.
24 M. Habib, and L. Zurawicki, “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment”, Journal of International Business 
studies, Vol.33, No.2, 2002, pp.291-307.
25 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
26 Globerman and Shapiro, Governance Infrastructure, Ibid.
27 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
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significant relationship between corruption and FDI, Egger and Winner 28, Bellos and Subasat 29, 
Bellos and Subasat 30, Subasat and Bellos 31 found positive significant relationship and finally 
Stein and Daude 32, Jadhav 33 could not find a statistically significant relationship. While Busse 
and Hefeker 34 found positive significant relationship between bureaucratic quality and FDI, 
Bellos and Subasat 35, Bellos and Subasat 36 found negative significant relationship. Wheeler 
and Mody  37 could not find a statistically significant relationship between administrative 
efficiency and FDI. While Globerman and Shapiro  38, Globerman and Shapiro  39, Mengistu 
and Ahdikary 40 found positive significant relationship between government effectiveness and 
FDI, Jadhav 41 could not find a statistically significant relationship.
We will review the sub-indices of public voice. While Busse and Hefeker  42, Bellos and 
Subasat 43 found positive significant relationship between democratic accountability and FDI, 
Bellos and Subasat 44 could not find a statistically significant relationship. While Globerman 
and Shapiro  45 found positive significant relationship between voice & accountability and 
FDI, Jadhav 46 found negative significant relationship and finally Globerman and Shapiro 47, 
Mengistu and Ahdikary 48 could not find a statistically significant relationship. Tuman and 
Emmert  49 found positive significant relationship between political rights and FDI, civil 
liberties and FDI.
28 P. Egger, and H. Winner, “Evidence on Corruption as an Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment”,, european 
Journal of political economy, Vol.21, No.4, 2005, pp.932-952.
29 S. Bellos, and T. Subasat, “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment: A Panel Gravity Model Approach”, Bulletin 
of economic Research, Vol.64, No.4, 2012, pp.565-574.
30 Bellos and Subasat, Governance and Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
31 T. Subasat, and S. Bellos, “Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: A Panel Gravity Model 
Approach”, Journal of management and sustainability, Vol.3, No.4, 2013, pp.151-156.
32 Stein and Daude, Ibid.
33 Jadhav, Ibid.
34 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
35 Bellos and Subasat, Governance and Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
36 Subasat and Bellos, Ibid.
37 Wheeler and Mody, Ibid.
38 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
39 Globerman and Shapiro, Governance Infrastructure, Ibid.
40 Mengistu and Ahdikary, Ibid.
41 Jadhav, Ibid.
42 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
43 Bellos and Subasat, Governance and Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
44 Subasat and Bellos, Ibid.
45 Globerman and Shapiro, Governance Infrastructure, Ibid.
46 Jadhav, Ibid.
47 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
48 Mengistu and Ahdikary, Ibid.
49 Tuman and Emmert, Ibid.
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4. Measuring Governance
Reviewing the literature, all the studies examining role of governance on FDI based on either just 
one index like corruption, political stability, etc. or aggregate indices as Kaufmann et al. 50, La 
Porta et al. 51, etc.
As it can be seen in the previous section, different authors led to different conclusions based on 
countries included, data span, estimation techniques and governance indices used. There are 
both similar and contrasting results with respect to these differences. According to Globerman 
and Shapiro 52, aggregate indicators like WGI developed by Kaufmann et al. 53 drawn from a 
variety of sources should provide more precise measures of governance than individual indicators 
like corruption or political stability. It is possible to measure the effect of different aspects of 
governance on FDI inflows by this way. That’s why four aggregate governance indicators created 
by sub-indices taken from ICRG and FRH databases used in the study.
Two aggregate indicators from WGI database; “political stability no violence” and “voice and 
accountability” will be analyzed for the robustness check of two aggregate governance clusters 
used in the study. The three governance indicators; political stability, administrative quality and 
public voice are based on governance indicators developed by Aysan et al. 54. But, the reason to 
include these indicators, the motivation behind using them and the sub-indices of the indicators 
differs.
4.1. Political Stability Index (PSI)
This index is constructed to measure the safety of FDI due to political stability of the host 
countries.
Since the FDI decision of MNCs based on motivations and concerns different than short-term 
capital flows, politically unstable countries are not preferred as host countries for FDI. Because, 
the investment decision initiated by a typical MNC base on the plans for future profits through 
future sales of goods and services. If the host country, which initially is politically stable, turns 
into unstable either because of internal and external conflict, or the impaired government, FDI 
projects which seems profitable in the beginning turns into losses for MNCs. Hence, MNCs either 
decreases their FDI to that host country or shift their FDI altogether to other host countries that 
are politically more stable.
50 D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical 
Issues”. hague Journal on the Rule of law, Vol.3, No.2, 2011, pp.220-246.
51 La Porta et al., Ibid.
52 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
53 Kaufmann et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators, Ibid.
54 Aysan et al., Ibid.
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4.2. Economic Stability Index (ESI)
This index is constructed to measure the sustainability of FDI due to economic stability of the 
host countries.
Economic stability is another important aspect of governance, since MNCs consider the costs and 
returns on the FDI projects. If an economy is governed by inadequate and inconsistent economic 
policies and turns into unstable one, it constitutes the major cause of unpredictable high costs. 
Returns on FDI projects, which seem profitable at the beginning turn into losses mainly due 
to exchange rate risks and inflation. Bad economic governance increases uncertainty and risks, 
which are detrimental to FDI inflows. Hence MNCs either prefer economically more stable host 
countries or just make FDI if they predicted that the time required to exploit full return on FDI 
comes before the time of the economy in the host country becomes unstable.
4.3. Administrative Quality Index (AQI)
This index is constructed to measure the quality of the relationship between investor and the 
administrative / bureaucratic institutions of the host country, and the protection of investor rights.
MNCs taking FDI decision in a host country evaluates the performance of bureaucracy based on 
how responsive is the system to the need of investors, does it take too much time and effort even 
to initiate simple steps of investment plans, do investor have to deal with red tape. The bad quality 
of bureaucracy is a detrimental factor for FDI, since it increases the time for implementation of 
investment plans; hence it increases the costs of investment due to time lags.
Another important factor is the role of corruption in carrying out investment plans of MNCs. It 
increases the cost of FDI; hence it is a detrimental factor, unless MNCs corrupt the administration 
of host countries in order to access better terms or privileges.
MNCs also consider the protection against expropriation, contract viability by the risk of 
unilateral contract modification or cancellation, and payment delays by the extent that profits 
can be transferred out of the host country to home country bases. These sub factors define the 
investment profile of a host country and it constitutes an important role for MNCs taking FDI 
decision in a host country since they show the extent of protection of investor rights.
4.4. Public Voice Index (PVI)
This index is constructed to measure the protection of consumer rights against investors.
Democratic institutions “provide checks and balances on elected officials, which in turn reduce 
arbitrary government intervention and lowers the risk of policy reversal and strengthen private 
property protection” 55. The type of products and services supplied by MNCs to domestic markets 
55 Asiedu and Lien, Ibid, p.1.
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are highly sensitive to the preferences of consumers if the consumer rights in the host country are 
well protected. Any reduction in the quality of goods and services offered to domestic consumers 
is confronted with public reaction either by the legal system which provides those rights to 
consumers through lawsuits or by democratic actions through boycott, rallies, assembly against 
MNCs. Hence MNCs investing in these kinds of host countries take this reality into account at 
the planning stage of their investment. Increasing protection of consumer rights either through 
legal system or democratic rights of the public do not constitute a detrimental factor for FDI 
inflows in these countries. On the contrary, they enlarge the preference set of consumers, which 
lead to increased amount of FDI inflows by MNCs.
5. Data
Both statistical and empirical analysis cover thirty-two advanced, seventy developing and 
seventeen least developed countries for the period 1996-2010 due to data availability. See 
Appendix 2 for the source of data and methodology for the calculated indices.
6. Statistical Analysis
6.1. Trend In FDI Inflows
Figure 1: Total FDI Inflows by Country Clusters
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
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Notes: The y-axis on the right for Least Developed Countries (LC). The y-axis on the left for 
advanced countries (AC), developing countries (DC) and for all countries taken together (ALL).
According to Figure 1, FDI inflows for all country clusters have been increased. According to 
the liner trend analysis, FDI inflows in developing and least developed countries increased more 
than advanced countries. Hence we can conclude that the share of advanced countries from FDI 
inflows have been declined while the share of developing and least developed countries have been 
increased.
6.2. Trend in Governance Infrastructure
Figure 2: Average PSI for DC
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
Average political stability of seventy developing countries has slight decreasing trend that 
decreased from 77 at 1996 to % 76 at 2010 according to Figure 2. There is no significant trend 
in the standard deviation, hence we cannot conclude whether convergence or divergence is 
experienced in this country cluster.
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Figure 3: Average ESI for DC
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
Average economic stability of seventy developing countries has a significant increasing trend that 
increased from 54 at 1996 to % 72 at 2010 according to Figure 3. There is no significant trend in 
the standard deviation.
Figure 4: Average AQI for DC
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
Average administrative quality of seventy developing countries has no significant trend that 
increased from 51 at 1996 to % 52 at 2010 according to Figure 4. There is a slight increasing 
trend in the standard deviation, hence it seems that these countries experienced divergence with 
respect to this indicator.
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Figure 5: Average PVI for DC
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
Average public voice of seventy developing countries has no significant trend that decreased from 
58 at 1996 to % 57 at 2010 according to Figure 5. There is a significant decreasing trend in the 
standard deviation; hence we can conclude that these countries experienced convergence with 
respect to this indicator.
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6.3. Trend in Other Variables
Figure 6: Other Variables I
 
Figure 6.6: Other Variables I  
 
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations 
According to Figure 6.6, advanced countries have the highest 
performance and least developed countries have the worst performance for all 
the variables. Developing countries performs lower than advanced countries and 
higher than least developed countries as we expected, since these variables are 
indicators of long-term performance of these countries indicating their 
development level that cannot be easily manipulated by ongoing government 
policies.   
Figure 6.7: Other Variables II 
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
According to Figure 6, advanced countries have the highest performance and least developed 
countries have the worst performance for all the variables. Developing countries performs lower 
than a v nced countries and higher than least developed countries as we expected, since these 
variables are indicators of long-term performance of these countries indicating their development 
level that cannot be easily manipulated by ongoing government policies.
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Figure 7: Other Variables II
 
 
According to Figure 6.7, developing and least developed countries have 
growth performance higher than advanced countries supporting the convergence 
hypothesis since the trend is positive for developing and least developed 
countries, while it is negative for advanced countries. Also, advanced countries 
have lack of natural resources compared with developing and least developed 
countries. Tariff rates are the highest in least developed countries, high in 
developing countries and lower in advanced countries due to the degree of 
integration with the global economy. But there is a decreasing trend in all 
country clusters. Real interest rates highest in the least developed countries, high 
in developing countries and lower in advanced countries. But there is a 
decreasing trend in all country clusters.  
Source: Authors’ Ow  Calculations
According to Figure 7, developing and least developed countries have growth performance 
hig er than advanced countries supporting the convergence hypothesis since th  tren  is positive 
for developing and least developed countries, while it is negative f r advanced cou tries. Also, 
advanced countries have lack of natural resources compared with developing and least developed 
countries. Tariff rates are the highest in least developed countries, high in developing countries 
and lower in advanced countries due to the degree of integration with the global economy. But 
there is a decreasing trend in all country clusters. Real interest rates highest in the least developed 
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countries, high in developing countries and lower in advanced countries. But there is a decreasing 
trend in all country clusters.
7. Empirical Analysis
7.1. System GMM Model
Reduced form equations for Models 1-6;
(1.1) FDIit = a FDIi,t-1 + b1 BASEit + b2 MOTit + eit
(1.2) eit = mi + nit
Validity depends on the assumption that the vit is not serially correlated. But if the vit is serially 
correlated of order 1 then, the researcher would need to restrict the instrument set starting with 
third lag or longer. If the researcher finds second order correlation, he or she would need to start 
with even longer lags 56.
(1.3) E(mi) = E(nit) = E(minit) = 0
(1.4) DFDIit = d DFDIi,t-1 + f DBASEit + l DMOTit + Dnit
(1.5) E[∆witμi] = 0
FDIit represents FDI inflows for country i in year t. FDIi,t-1 represents FDI inflows for country i 
in year t-1 to measure the oligopolistic reaction. BASEit represents base factors including, human 
capital, physical infrastructure, our four governance variables and two governance indicators from 
WGI 57. MOTit represents motivation factors as GDP growth, availability of natural resources, 
financial depth, trade openness, tariff rates and real interest rates for country i in year t.
Except Model 1.7 and Model 1.8 all the regressions include governance indicators as base factor. 
Model 1.7 incorporates human capital and Model 1.8 incorporates physical infrastructure as base 
factors. Since there exists high correlation between governance infrastructure, human capital and 
physical infrastructure, all these base factors regressed separately. All the regressions include lag 
of FDI inflows. All regressions include GDP growth as motivation factor. All other motivation 
factors are included in the regressions separately.
Reduced form equations for Model 7;
(2.1) FDIit = a FDIi,t-1 + b1 BASEit + b2 MOTit + b3 BASEMOTit + eit
(2.2) eit = mi + nit
(2.3) E(mi) = E(nit) = E(minit) = 0
(2.4) DFDIit = dDFDIi,t-1 + fDBASEit + lDMOTit + gDBASEMOTit + Dnit
(2.5) E[∆witμi] = 0
56 Roodman, Ibid.
57 WGI, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators”, The world Bank, 2014.
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FDIit represents FDI inflows for country i in year t. FDIi,t-1 represents FDI inflows for country i in 
year t-1 to measure the oligopolistic reaction. BASEit represents one of our governance variables. 
MOTit represents motivation factors, GDP growth or availability of natural resources for country i 
in year t. BASEMOTit represents interaction of a base and motivation factor for country i in year t.
7.2. System GMM Analysis
Table 1: GMM Estimation Results I
Dependent Variable: fdi
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 Model 1.6 Model 1.7 Model 1.8
l.fdi 0.604*** 0.600*** 0.416** 0.606*** 0.758*** 0.625*** 0.758*** 0.827***
(0.120) (0.103) (0.189) (0.121) (0.074) (0.099) (0.072) (0.111)
psi 0.023***
(0.008)
esi 0.019**
(0.007)
aqi 0.050**
(0.020)
pvi 0.022**
(0.010)
psnv 0.893*
(0.530)
va 0.911*
(0.537)
gdpgr 0.136** 0.136** 0.167* 0.190*** 0.243*** 0.317*** 0.131** 0.174**
(0.058) (0.054) (0.086) (0.058) (0.052) (0.083) (0.061) (0.068)
humcap 0.010*
(0.006)
infra -0.008
(0.011)
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Countries 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Instruments 24 23 24 24 25 18 24 27
Hansen 0.839 0.671 0.616 0.585 0.463 0.560 0.665 0.178
AR(4) 0.136 0.119 0.167 0.133 0.105 0.117 0.108 0.102
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
Notes: The values in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance levels 
at % 1, % 5 and % 10 respectively. AR(#) is test for #-order serial correlation in the #-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under 
the null that all instruments are valid. All the independent variables except tariff are treated 
endogenously. Appropriate lags of endogenous variables were instrumented according to AR(#) 
test of serial correlation
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Table 2: GMM Estimation Results II
Dependent Variable: fdi
Model 2.1 Model 2.4 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4
l.fdi 0.355** 0.451** 0.558*** 0.615*** 0.542*** 0.470**
(0.166) (0.173) (0.119) (0.194) (0.130) (0.181)
psi 0.034*** 0.020**
(0.011) (0.010)
esi 0.020*
(0.011)
aqi 0.036*
(0.020)
pvi 0.034** 0.026*
(0.017) (0.014)
gdpgr 0.152** 0.202** 0.143*** 0.163*** 0.182*** 0.127**
(0.061) (0.097) (0.048) (0.048) (0.055) (0.057)
natural -0.010 -0.019
(0.024) (0.033)
findep 0.002 -0.010 0.002 0.009
(0.016) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013)
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Countries 68 68 67 67 67 67
Instruments 32 36 32 39 44 28
Hansen 0.861 0.174 0.658 0.391 0.122 0.410
AR(4) 0.247 0.178 0.151 0.134 0.135 0.179
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
Notes: The values in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance levels 
at % 1, % 5 and % 10 respectively. AR(#) is test for #-order serial correlation in the #-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under 
the null that all instruments are valid. All the independent variables except tariff are treated 
endogenously. Appropriate lags of endogenous variables were instrumented according to AR(#) 
test of serial correlation.
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Table 3: GMM Estimation Results III
Dependent Variable: fdi
Model 4.1 Model 5.2 Model 6.2 Model 6.3 Model 7.2 Model 7.3 Model 7.4
l.fdi 0.524** 0.501*** 0.569*** 0.369* 0.527*** 0.602*** 0.671***
(0.246) (0.147) (0.129) (0.190) (0.129) (0.133) (0.102)
psi 0.037**
(0.016)
esi 0.020* 0.018* 0.016*
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
aqi 0.042* 0.054**
(0.025) (0.027)
pvi 0.035**
(0.017)
gdpgr 0.118* 0.168*** 0.191*** 0.260*** -0.388 -0.113 -0.116
(0.066) (0.059) (0.072) (0.090) (0.212) (0.102 (0.126)
trop -0.018
(0.015)
tariff -0.031
(0.031)
rint -0.016 0.034
(0.033) (0.036)
esigdpgr 0.006*
(0.003)
aqigdpgr 0.005**
(0.002)
pvigdpgr 0.005**
(0.002)
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Countries 67 65 57 57 70 70 70
Instruments 24 33 43 32 44 40 48
Hansen 0.348 0.121 0.203 0.463 0.182 0.151 0.175
AR(4) 0.169 0.120 0.118 0.173 0.115 0.133 0.129
Source: Authors’ Own Calculations
Notes: The values in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance levels 
at % 1, % 5 and % 10 respectively. AR(#) is test for #-order serial correlation in the #-differenced 
residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test of over-identification is under 
the null that all instruments are valid. All the independent variables except tariff are treated 
endogenously. Appropriate lags of endogenous variables were instrumented according to AR(#) 
test of serial correlation.
According to Tables 7.1-7.3, lag of FDI inflows have positive significant effect on current FDI 
inflows, which confirms oligopolistic reaction theory. Hence we can conclude that FDI is an 
“interactive kind of corporate behavior by which rival firms in an industry composed of a few 
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large firms counter one another’s moves by making similar moves themselves” 58. The results of 
the study supports Knickerbocker 59, Flowers 60 and Kinoshita 61 even they use other proxies to 
measure oligopolistic reaction. Estimation results also support Cheng and Kwan 62, Noorbaksh 
et al. 63, Biglaiser and DeRouen 64, Biglaiser and Staats 65, Cantah et al. 66 in the sense that there 
exists a clustering effect for FDI, the increase (decrease) in FDI made in previous year leads to 
increase (decrease) in FDI made in current year.
Tables 7.1-7.3 reveal that all the governance variables have positive significant effect on 
FDI inflows. Hence better governance infrastructure attracts higher amount of FDI inflows 
in developing countries. Our results are robust in the sense that using two other governance 
variables from WGI confirms our results. Our results regarding governance variables are also 
robust in the sense that they have positive significant coefficients in each regression model. Our 
results support the findings of Globerman and Shapiro 67, Buchanan et al. 68 regarding governance 
infrastructure, Busse and Hefeker 69 regarding political stability, Asiedu and Lien 70 for economic 
stability, Globerman and Shapiro 71, Busse and Hefeker 72 regarding administrative quality, Busse 
and Hefeker 73 regarding public voice.
According to Tables 7.1-7.3, market growth proxied by GDP growth has a positive significant 
effect on FDI inflows in developing countries. Hence we can conclude that rapidly growing 
foreign markets should attract foreign investors interested in expanding their stakes overseas. 
After all, the gains in output needed to meet rapidly increasing demand offer opportunities for 
economies of scale. Although MNCs may ignore scale considerations at current period, they 
58 Knickerbocker, F. T., oligopolistic Reaction and the multinational enterprise, Cambridge (MA), Harvard 
University Press, 1973, p.6.
59 Knickerbocker, Ibid.
60 E. B. Flowers, “Oligopolistic Reaction in European and Canadian Direct Investment in the United States”, Journal 
of International Business studies, Vol.7, 1976, pp.43–55. 
61 Y. Kinoshita, “Firm Size and Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment”, ceRGe-eI working paper series, No. 
135, 1998.
62 L. K. Cheng, and Y. K.Kwan, “What are the Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct Investment: The Chinese 
Experience”, Journal of International economics, Vol.51, No.2, 2000, pp. 379-400.
63 F. Noorbakhsh, A. Paloni, and A. Youssef, “Human Capital and FDI Inflows to Developing Countries: New Empirical 
Evidence”, world development, Vol.29, No.9, 2001, pp.1593-1610.
64 G. Biglaiser, and K. DeRouen, “The Expansion of Neoliberal Economic Reforms in Latin America”. International 
studies Quarterly, Vol.48, No.3, 2004, pp.561-578.
65 G. Biglaiser, and J. L Staats, “Do Political Institutions Affect Foreign Direct Investment? A Survey of US Corporations 
in Latin America”. political Research Quarterly, Vol.63, No.3, 2010, pp.508-522.
66 W. G. Cantah, E. A. Wiafe, and A. Adams, “Foreign Direct Investment and Trade Policy Openness in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, mpRa paper, No.58074, 2013.
67 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
68 B. G. Buchanan, Q. V. Le, and M. Rishi, “Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Quality: Some Empirical 
Evidence”, International Review of financial analysis, Vol.21, 2012, pp.81-89.
69 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
70 Asiedu and Lien, Ibid.
71 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
72 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
73 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
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want assurance that scale advantages will be possible in the future; so rapid growth gives this 
assurance 74. Our results support the findings of Noorbaksh et al. 75.
We also found that in Table 7.1, human capital has a positive significant effect on FDI inflows in 
developing countries. Hence improvement in human capital attracts FDI in advanced countries. 
Our results support the findings of Narula 76, Noorbaksh et al. 77, Globerman and Shapiro 78. Our 
findings in Table 7.1 show that physical infrastructure has no significant effect on FDI inflows in 
developing countries. Our results support the findings of Loree and Guisinger 79.
Estimation results of Model 2.1 and 2.4 in Table 7.2 reveal that availability of natural resources 
has no significant effect on FDI inflows in developing countries. Inspecting the estimation results 
of Model 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 in Table 7.2, financial depth has no significant effect on FDI inflows 
in developing countries. Model 4.1 in Table 7.3 repots that trade openness has no significant 
effect on FDI inflows in developing countries. Our results support the findings of Globerman 
and Shapiro 80, Busse and Hefeker 81. Estimation results of Model 5.2 in Table 7.3 reveal that tariff 
rates have no significant effect on FDI inflows in developing countries. Inspecting the empirical 
findings of Models 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 in Table 7.3, real interest rate has no significant effect on 
FDI inflows in developing countries.
According to the estimation results of Models 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 in Table 7.3, interaction term 
of governance indicators and GDP growth has a positive significant effect on FDI inflows in 
developing countries, even GDP growth has no significant effect in these models. It may be 
concluded that market growth, as a motivation factor alone, is not sufficient for MNCs to take 
FDI decision in developing countries if economic instability occurs or administrative quality, 
civil rights and liberties deteriorate in the host country.
8. Conclusion
Empirical findings show that improving all aspects of governance quality attracts more FDI 
inflows in developing countries. We may conclude that following economic policies aimed to 
increase GDP growth rate attract more FDI inflows. Investing in human capital to match up the 
necessary skill set demanded by MNCs seems to attract more FDI inflows. It seems that investing 
in physical infrastructure does not lead to higher amount of FDI inflows since infrastructure 
investment in developing countries are generally not planned strategically leading to wasting of 
resources and blended with political concerns to effect the voting behavior of the public. Finally, 
74 Knickerbocker, Ibid.
75 Noorbaksh et al., Ibid.
76 R. Narula, multinational Investment and economic structure: Globalization and competitiveness, Routledge, 
London, 1996.
77 Noorbaksh et al., Ibid.
78 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
79 Loree and Guisinger, Ibid.
80 Globerman and Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment, Ibid.
81 Busse and Hefeker, Ibid.
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it is found that a motivation factor alone whether GDP growth may not be sufficient for MNCs 
to take FDI decision since they also observe governance infrastructure in host countries and any 
deterioration in governance leads to decreasing amount of FDI inflows.
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Appendix 1: List of Developing Countries
developing countries (dc)
Albania Dominican Republic Kuwait Romania
Algeria Ecuador Libya Russia
Argentina Egypt Lithuania Saudi Arabia
Armenia El Salvador Malaysia South Africa
Bahrain Gabon Mexico Sri Lanka
Bolivia Ghana Moldova Syria
Botswana Guatemala Mongolia Thailand
Brazil Guyana Morocco Trinidad & Tobago
Brunei Honduras Namibia Tunisia
Bulgaria Hungary Nicaragua Turkey
Cameroon India Pakistan United Arab Emirates
Chile Indonesia Panama Ukraine
China Iran Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Colombia Iraq Paraguay Venezuela
Congo Jamaica Peru Vietnam
Costa Rica Jordan Philippines Zimbabwe
Côte d’Ivoire Kazakhstan Poland
Croatia Kenya Qatar
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Appendix 2: Data Sources
variable name code sub Indices method data source
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows fdi converted to billion dollars Unctad Database (2014)
Our Governance Indicators
Political Stability Index psi Average
Government Stability Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Internal Conflict Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
External Conflict Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Economic Stability Index esi Average
Risk for Budget Balance Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Risk for Current Account as % of GDP Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Risk for Exchange Rate Stability Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Risk for Foreign Debt Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Risk for Inflation Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Risk for International Liquidity Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Administrative Quality Index aqi Average
Investment Profile Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Bureaucracy Quality Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Corruption Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Public Voice Index pvi Average
Democratic Accountability Rescaled 0-100 PRS Group, ICRG Database (2011)
Political Rights Inverted and Rescaled 0-100 Freedom House Database (2012)
Civil Liberties Inverted and Rescaled 0-100 Freedom House Database (2012)
The Worldwide Governance Indicators
Political Stability Absence of Violence psnv Raw WGI (2014)
Voice and Accountability va Raw WGI (2014)
GDP Growth gdpgr GDP growth (annual %) raw WDI (2014)
Human Capital humcap (pri*0.25+sec*0.35+ter*0.40)
Completed Primary Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
Completed Secondary Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
Completed tertiaryTertiary Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
Infrastructure infra (basinf+cominf+transinf)/3
Basic (basinf) average
   Access to electricity (% of population) raw WDI (2014)
   Improved water source (% of population) raw WDI (2014)
Communication (cominf) average
   Internet users (per 100 people) Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
   Telephone lines (per 100 people) Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
Transportation (transinf) average
   Roads, total network / population Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
   Rail lines (total route-km) / population Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
   Air transport, passengers carried / population Rescaled 0-100 WDI (2014)
Natural Resources natural Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) raw WDI (2014)
Financial Depth findep Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP raw WDI (2014)
Trade Openness trop Trade (% of GDP) (Export+Import)/GDP WDI (2014)
Tariff Rate tariff Tariff rate, applied, simple mean, all products (%) raw WDI (2014)
Real Interest Rate rint Real interest rate (%) raw WDI (2014)

